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The Soft Power Practices of the Ming Dynasty
and Zheng He’s First Voyage
By Peter Weisser
Abstract: This article will examine the soft power aspects of Zheng
He’s life as well as the soft power efforts of the People’s Republic
of China in the modern day, using Zheng He as an example to
show the historical parallels between the two while examining the
motivations of the PRC which is a search for legitimacy. This
article will look into the parallels that exist between Zheng He and
the soft power practiced in the fifteenth and twenty-first centuries
within China. Furthermore, the perceptions and meanings of soft
power in China may be different than that of other nations or other
periods of time.1

In the study of world politics today, there is a great deal of focus
on the soft power aims of the People’s Republic of China. Soft
power is defined as a persuasive approach to world politics,
usually accomplished through diplomacy, with influences both
political and cultural in aim. Joseph S. Nye, the academic who first
1

The following article contains text and excerpts from my longer scholarly work
“The Admiral ‘s Carrot and Stick” which was a long and complex study
regarding the relationships between Soft Power as practiced by the Ming-era
Admiral Zheng He and its relationship to the soft power practices of the modern
PRC. This article is a shortened version which focuses exclusively on the first
voyage of Zheng He and the soft power practices of the Ming Dynasty along
with some modern-day examples of the PRC continuing a soft power policy that
reaches all the way back to the early dynasties of China, with specific focus on
the Ming.
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coined the term, describes soft power as the “carrot and stick”
approach to world politics.2 There is, however, a very common
misconception that the PRC’s push for soft power is a recent affair.
Indeed, China has been seen as a rising power in the last few
decades but has taken a unique view of its own power as nonhegemonic. From the point of view of the PRC, they are a nonhegemonic power and claim that the amount of soft power that the
PRC has gained in the last few decades has been a result of
China’s peaceful rise. The perception of what soft power is,
however, may differ from that of western nations. For example,
soft power from the perspective of Beijing may include force so
long as it's not military in nature. This is not to say however that
“charm” does not have a role in Beijing’s usage of soft power;
indeed the massive cultural influence that Beijing holds is quite
considerable and is used in negotiations through cultural soft
power.
In the last few years, the United States under the Trump
administration has moved away from international cooperation and
the possibility that Trump is ceding America’s global leadership
role is becoming more apparent. As the United States seems to be
pushing away from globalization, and as America has been willing
to push away former allies and interests, China under President Xi
Jinping has been more than willing to fill the void. Historically,
China has long considered the nineteenth century as its “century of
humiliation” when colonial powers forced a series of unequal
treaties during the two Opium Wars with Great Britain. In the first
years of the twentieth century the anti-foreign Boxer Uprising
aftermath also forced humiliating concessions on the waning Qing
Dynasty. In 1911 they would fall from power leaving space for the
Republic of China to take over.
First, in 1927, the Nationalist movement arose, and later in
1948, Mao Zedong’s Communists came into power, making the
twentieth century a moment of upheaval in China’s history.
2

Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Soft Power, The Means to Success in World Politics (New
York: PublicAffairs), 5.
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Beijing’s international relations today are often motivated by an
urge to recapture the lost glory of the “Middle Kingdom” and
through soft power methods China has found a way to accomplish
this by finding ways to improve Beijing’s international image.
While some scholars would refer to “soft power” as a collective
term for Beijing’s motivations, there are problems with portraying
these motivations as purely an issue of soft power versus hard
power. What Beijing and the PRC’s perception of soft power is can
be very different from that of the United States and the European
Union, for example. Beijing’s perception of its soft power in some
cases may blur the lines of the original concept of soft power as
originally defined. In any case, it seems that the term soft power
may be a problematic concept to give simple definitions to. It will
be important to distinguish and unpack what soft power means, as
well as discussing the problematic concept of soft power itself and
critically examine if Beijing’s diplomatic practices can be
considered soft power at all.
The use of soft power in China’s history has hardly been a
recent development. During the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644),
Admiral Zheng He (1371-1433), a eunuch military commander and
explorer, exercised soft power during the rule of Zhu Di, the
Yongle Emperor (1402-1424) and third emperor of the Ming
Dynasty. Zheng He traveled across the South China Sea and the
Indian Ocean, along the way visiting numerous countries in an
effort to show both the wealth and power of the Ming Dynasty, a
charm offensive in its own right. In the modern day, author Joshua
Kurlantzick noted that China’s soft power resembles that of a “lion
and not a mouse.”3 This form of power may be different from
traditional soft power in that it is used by authoritarian regimes as a
form of coercing other countries viewpoints to the regimes point of
view. According to The National Endowment for Democracy, a
Washington based think-tank, this is defined as “sharp power.”

3

Joshua Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power is
Transforming the World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 6.
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China has declared to the rest of the world on many
occasions that it takes a path of peaceful development and is
committed to upholding world peace and promoting common
development and prosperity for all countries. At the beginning of
the second decade of the twenty-first century and on the occasion
of the ninetieth anniversary of the founding of the Communist
Party of China (CPC), China declared solemnly again to the world
that peaceful development is a strategic choice made by China to
realize modernization, make itself strong and prosperous, and
make more contributions to the progress of human civilization.
Going forward, China will unswervingly follow the path of
peaceful development.
This idea of cooperation and common development has
been a crucial part of China’s recent success in diplomacy within
the last decade. Rather than seeing China as an antagonist on the
world stage, the PRC has allowed a more benevolent and noninterventionist image of the country to be formed by its new state
propaganda. This new view allows Beijing to wield its soft power
in a way that creates an environment for former adversaries to
become partners. Whether or not the Communist system of the
PRC will survive going forward in its present form under the face
of such pragmatism will also be something to consider in the
coming decades.
The Emperor and the Admiral: The Life and Adventures of
Zheng He and its Impact on Soft Power Relations
Before covering the specifics of Zheng He’s life, it would be
prudent to present a basic overview of the early history of the Ming
Dynasty (1368-1644), its first two emperors, and the rise of Zhu
Di, the third emperor of the Ming Dynasty and Zheng He’s patron.
By looking at these historical figures we will see the kind of world
Zheng He lived in, and what the political realities were that he
faced. The Ming Dynasty was the last ethnically Han dynasty in
the history of China. The previous dynasty, the Yuan Dynasty
(1271-1368) founded by Kublai Khan (1215-1294) was
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overthrown in 1368 by Zhu Yuanzhang, the leader of the rebellion
against the Yuan, who would come to be known as Ming Taizu
(r.1368-1398) first emperor of the Ming Dynasty. Like many
founders of previous dynasties, Taizu was of humble birth, but he
was able to rally support against the hated Mongols. He succeeded
in his civil war despite the odds, against the more militarily
powerful Yuan.4 Once the Yuan Dynasty fell in 1368, Zhu
Yuanzhang began to consolidate power in his new capital of
Nanjing (Nanking) and began to build a state infrastructure. The
Confucian scholars benefited the most from this new arrangement
of power while the court eunuchs felt a decrease in power due to
Zhu Yuanzhang’s distrust of them.5 Many of Zhu Yuanzhang’s
closest friends and allies took up the position of commanders of
Ming’s armies. But this arrangement would not last long. After the
purges of 1380, many of the merit-based nobility in the empire
were executed and Zhu Yuanzhang’s sons would remain as the
most powerful military commanders in the empire, commanding
vast armies from their fiefs. Zhu Yuanzhang’s government was,
like many, autocratic and incredibly harsh in the face of rebellion.
The Great Ming Code were the written laws of the Ming Dynasty
and as seen from the following excerpt, the punishment for treason
against the throne was harsh indeed, showing the considerable
punishment any potential rebel would have:
Rebellion, (that is plotting against the dynasty) and
lese-majeste (that is plotting to desecrate imperial
ancestral altars, mausoleums, and palaces). All
conspirators regardless of whether they are leaders
or followers shall be executed by slicing. Their
grandfathers, fathers, sons, grandsons, older
brothers, younger brothers, and those who live with
them regardless of surname differences; sons of
4

William Theodore de Bary and Irene Bloom, Sources of Chinese Tradition,
Vol. 1 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 779.
5
Shin-Shan Henry Tsai, Eunuchs of The Ming Dynasty (Albany: State
University of New York Press. 1996), 13.
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paternal uncles and brothers regardless of whether
they have the same registration; if they are sixteen
years of age or over, regardless of serious or
crippling disease, they shall be executed. Those
fifteen or below, mothers, daughters, wives, and
concubines older and younger sisters, sons’ wives
and concubines, shall be given as slaves to the
households of titular nobility. Their property shall
be confiscated by the government…6
The Origins of the Ming Dynasty
The rise to power of Zhu Yuanzhang demonstrates the interplay
between hard and soft power. Zhu Yuanzhang used the power of
charm and persuasion when he was a peasant soldier rebelling
against the Yuan Dynasty. Once Zhu Yuanzhang came to power
however, he used coercion and strict autocratic policies to cement
his rule. This is a common strategy throughout history with
autocratic rulers who often play the liberator at first but become
the tyrant once their power is achieved. Zhu Yuanzhang was very
conscious of how he was able to overthrow the Yuan through
popular rebellion and became increasingly paranoid that the same
might be done to him. In 1380, he executed Chancellor Hu
Weiyong on charges of conspiracy and forming a faction (a capital
crime) and thereafter abolished the chancellery.7 In the wake of
this event, Zhu Yuanzhang established the Jinyiwei (Embroidered
Uniform Guard) as his secret police and they would assist
considerably in helping Zhu Yuanzhang in the purges during his
later reign.

6

Da Ming Lu, “Great Ming Code,” as cited in William Theodore de Barry and
Irene Bloom, Sources of Chinese Tradition, Vol. 1 (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1999), 784.
7
Edward L. Dryer, Zheng He and the Oceans of the Early Ming Dynasty (New
York: Pearson Education), 17.
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Zhu Yuanzhong fathered twenty-six sons and sixteen
daughters through the empress Ma and his numerous concubines.8
One of these sons, Zhu Di (r.1402-1424) the future Yongle
emperor, was born from Zhu Yuanzhang’s lesser consorts. Zhu Di
would eventually become the third emperor of the Ming Dynasty
but not until after winning a successful civil war that would not
end until 1402 against his nephew Zhu Yunwen (1377-1402) the
future Jianwen emperor, who would rule as the second emperor of
the dynasty.
The Early Life of Zheng He and Zhu Di’s Ascension
In the aftermath of the toppling of the Yuan Dynasty in 1368, the
Mongols and remnant Yuan forces retreated to Yunnan, with the
newly created Ming Dynasty hot on their heels. In 1374, Zhu
Yuanzhang demanded that the Mongols and their leader
Basalawarmi submit to Ming rule and sent envoys to convey this
message. The envoys were killed, and in response the Ming forces
under General Fu Youde invaded Yunnan. Fu Youde’s 300,000
strong army successfully invaded Yunnan and by 1382 had
captured the provincial seat of Kunming after which the rebellion’s
leaders committed suicide to avoid capture. Fu Youde then began a
reign of terror against the local population, killing hundreds of
thousands of Miao and Yao tribesmen.9 Another common method
used against the population was the kidnapping of young boys to
serve as eunuchs in the imperial court. One of these boys was a
young ten-year-old child by the name of Ma He. Ma He’s surname
Ma, according to Dryer, often but not always indicated Muslim
faith.10 Also, according to Dryer, Ma He’s grandfather and father
both had the name Haji indicating they had completed the Hajj, a
pilgrimage to Mecca. While Ma He’s family were of Chinese
8

Hok Lam Chan, “Ming Taizu’s Problem with His Sons: Prince Qin’s
Criminality and Early-Ming Politics,” Asia Major 20, no.1 (2007): 45.
9
Louise Levathes, When China Ruled the Seas: The Treasure Fleet of the
Dragon Throne, 1405-1433 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), 57.
10
Dryer, Zheng He, 22.
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Muslim extraction, Ma He was known to mostly practice
Buddhism in his religious life and took a Buddhist name.11 The
boy was taken by Fu Youde and was subjected to castration.
According to Levathes, in China during this time period castration
was accomplished by the quick stroke of a knife that cut off both
the penis and testes of the victim with a plug left in the urethra.12
After this brutal act, Ma He was put into the household of the
Prince of Yan, Zhu Di.
Growing up in the Prince of Yan’s court, Ma He rose
through the ranks to become an able military commander, one of
the commanders during the siege of Beijing in 1399.13 Early in his
life at court, Ma He befriended Zhu Di, and the young prince and
the eunuch had become very close friends. Ma He served as a
boyhood companion and later in life as a rising military general.
These early skirmishes in Mongolia were formative years for Ma
He and were crucial for him to receive the necessary training for a
military career. Most importantly, the campaigns and hard fighting
forged an ever-closer bond between Zhu Di and Ma He. These
campaigns would also give Zhu Di’s troops an opportunity to “cut
their teeth” in warfare. The veterans would prove crucial to the
1399-1402 Ming Civil War, especially the Mongol defectors of the
Uriyangqad tribe who fought for Zhu Di in the civil war. In
particular, a Mongol leader by the name of Nagahachu who
surrendered to Zhu Di during his campaign against Inner
Mongolia. Zhu Di treated Nagahachu and his men like honored
guests and soon convinced them to join his forces. These expert
horse-archers would prove to be a strategic asset in the civil war.14
This consolidation of forces and military power showed that Zhu
Di was thinking in the long term, indeed his chances of success in
the beginning of the war was nowhere near as dramatic and
climactic as the final siege of Nanjing in January 1402.
11

Ibid., 5.
Levathes, When China Ruled the Seas, 57.
13
Ibid.
14
Ibid., 124.
12
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Zhu Di had left Beijing with his generals; among them
were Ma He and Zhu Di’s new Uriyangqad allies. With the help of
two defected commanders who agreed to open the gates, Zhu Di,
Ma He and the rebel army marched through Nanjing’s Jinchuan
gate on July 17, 1402. By the time Zhu Di had reached the
Imperial palace, the Jianwen Emperor’s last loyal servants and
guards had set the Imperial Palace ablaze. A charred corpse was
presented to Zhu Di as the corpse of his nephew, but the corpse
was so badly burned it could not be identified. According to the
Comprehensive Mirror of the Ming Dynasty, a work written by
Chinese historian Xia Xe, the Jianwen Emperor Zhu Yunwen very
likely died in the conflagration, although there were rumors he had
escaped, most famously as a monk, as cited by Leavthes.15
Despite these rumors Zhu Di ascended to the Dragon
Throne on the 17th of July as the Yongle (perpetual happiness)
Emperor. Zhu Di, being an usurper was quick to find ways to give
himself legitimacy and prove that the Mandate of Heaven had
indeed been granted to him. However, the rumors of his nephew’s
survival haunted him and so he almost immediately started
financing searches for his possible whereabouts or conclusive
evidence of his death. Zhu Di’s eunuch general Ma He for his part
also rose in stature due to his invaluable generalship during this
campaign. Ma He was elevated by Zhu Di to the position of
Taijian (Grand Director) of the Directorate of Palace Servants, one
of the highest-ranking positions a Palace Eunuch could attain. This
also allowed Ma He the right to wear the red robes of a highranking Eunuch of the court, a symbol of his new status. In 1404
on New Year’s Day in commemoration of Ma He’s defense of the
Zheng Village Dike during the civil war, Zhu Di conferred upon
Ma He the name of Zheng in honor of his role in this battle.
The Practice of Ming Soft Power on Zheng He’s First Voyage

15

Xia Xe, Comprehensive Mirror of the Ming Dynasty (Beijing: Zhonghua
shuju, 1959), Chapter 14.
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While Zhu Di now had full and absolute power as emperor, he was
still in a very tenuous position. First of all, Zhu Di and the entire
empire were painfully aware that he was an usurper. This was
nothing new in the history of China, indeed the concept of the
Mandate of Heaven, an ideal similar to the European “Divine
Right of Kings” seemed to support it. The Mandate of Heaven was
a concept started in the Zhou Dynasty (1046 BC–256 BC) that
justified a ruler’s divine right of rule and the right of rebellion
against an unjust ruler who would have lost the mandate in the
eyes of the divine. The tricky part in this case was that the loss of
the Mandate of Heaven usually applied to one dynasty
overthrowing another, rather than a usurpation of the same
dynasty, although Zhu Di was hardly alone in being the usurper of
the same dynasty. The Mandate of Heaven in a more modern
interpretation can be seen as analogous to popular public support
of the ruling dynasty, the fact that the heavens had shown support
by allowing the new Emperor to be victorious in a sense proved his
legitimacy in the eyes of the people. Nevertheless, the possible
survival of Zhu Yunwen, the Jianwen Emperor, disturbed and
worried Zhu Di greatly. Not only were there rumors that he had
escaped disguised as a monk, but there were other rumors that Zhu
Yunwen had escaped overseas, plotting his return to China.16
Regardless of whether this was true or not, Zhu Di was in
desperate need to prove his rule as legitimate and there was no
better way to gain legitimacy than to have it acknowledged by
rulers of China’s neighbors.
In 1403, still new on the throne, Zhu Di ordered the
construction of the Treasure Fleet, a vast armada of war and trade
ships that would sail around the Indian Ocean and collect tribute
and acknowledgement of the Ming Dynasty’s superiority from
China’s neighbors17 The military usage of this fleet and the threat
of force in a hard power sense could not be denied, but Zhu Di’s
plans intended a more diplomatic, soft power tone. These ships
16
17

Levathes, When China Ruled the Seas, 88.
Ibid., 98.
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would display the vast wealth and power of the Ming and its new
emperor, showing the benefits of token submission under the
tribute trade system. The rumors of the Jianwen’s survival overseas
indeed may have been a motivation for these journeys although
according to Yang Wei, that was very unlikely as the cost of
launching seven voyages because of a mere rumor would not have
been very feasible.18
In autumn 1405, after over a year of planning and
construction Zheng He’s grand armada sailed out of Longjiang
towards the state of Champa (Vietnam). While in Champa, Zheng
He traded in Ming porcelain and silks. Moving on from Champa,
the armada made its way to the island of Java. The Chinese and
Javanese had endured difficult relations in the past, culminating in
the 1377 execution of several Chinese envoys—sent by China in
order to force the recognition of the state Palembang, a rival of the
Javanese—by Javanese King Hayam Wuruk.19 This was, of course,
an affront to the Dragon Throne, and trade as a result had dwindled
to nothing; Zheng He was determined to reverse this.
On his way to Java and Sumatra, Zheng He had avoided the
state of Palembang, which out of all the city states was the
wealthiest.20 Their wealth came as a result of a war between the
Javanese city states who had claimed Palembang as their own and
had installed a Javanese controlled puppet government in the city.
The inhabitants of Palembang had thrown out the Javanese but
during this time of upheaval, the notorious Chinese pirate Chen
Zuyi took control of the city and made Palembang a stronghold of
piracy and lawlessness, similar to the “Pirate Republic” of Nassau
in the early eighteenth century during British rule in the Bahamas.
On his return to China, Zheng He would deal with Chen Zuyi but
the time was not quite right for a full military engagement,
especially when Zheng He was trying to repair relations with the
18

Yang Wei, “Admiral Zheng He’s Voyages to the “West Oceans,”” Education
about Asia 19, no. 2 (Fall 2014): 1.
19
Levathes, When China Ruled the Seas, 98.
20
Ibid., 98.
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Javanese, showing that at least for now, soft power diplomacy
would win the day.21
After spending some time in Java and Sumatra trading, the
fleet moved on to the kingdom of Ceylon (Sri Lanka), where
Zheng He met with a much different reception than he did in Java,
which was rather positive compared to that of Ceylon. Zheng He
noted that the ruler of Ceylon, as cited by Dryer and Levathes, had
treated him and the emperor’s emissaries badly and had proved
“arrogant and disrespectful and wanted to harm Zheng He.”22
Zheng He decided it would be best to leave Ceylon for the time
being but made note of Ceylon’s military defenses and vast wealth
in precious gemstones.
According to Ma Huan, a Chinese Muslim scholar who
participated in the voyages and a contemporary of both Zheng He
and Fei Xin, Zheng He and the fleet made haste to their original
destination of Calicut which the Chinese regarded as “The Great
Country of the Western Ocean” showing the amount of prestige
and admiration the Chinese held for this West Indian city state. Ma
Huan described the people there as being “honest and trustworthy.”
According to Levathes, Zheng He stayed in Calicut from
December 1406 to April 1407.23 The unusual extended duration of
this trade mission was due to the rituals and bargaining that was a
standard part of an official trade mission sent by the emperor.
Zheng He’s experience in Calicut was peaceful and he knew that
by following a soft power policy he could gain a favorable trade
relationship with Calicut, one of the busiest ports in all of Asia.
From this port flowed goods from all over Asia, Europe and the
Middle East. He also took great care to show respect to the
Zamurin, the title of the ruler of Calicut.24
In April the fleet began its return journey to China. Coming
along with Zheng He were ambassadors from Calicut, Java and
Sumatra who were to be taken to the imperial court to submit
21

Wei, “Admiral Zheng He,” 28.
Levathes, When China Ruled the Seas, 100.
23
Ibid.
24
Ibid., 100-101.
22
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themselves to Zhu Di, a time-honored ritual in Imperial China.
Emissaries would prostrate themselves before the emperor in
submission, and in return the emperor would reward them with
rich gifts and treat them as guests of extreme honor. But there was
one further amount of business that had to be taken care of—the
pirate Chen Zuyi. Here Zheng He abandoned his soft power policy
and turned the wrath of the Ming Navy onto Chen Zuyi. Zheng He
utterly destroyed the pirates and burned their hideout in
Palembang, both freeing the people of Palembang from Chen
Zuyi’s rule and capturing alive the pirate. Chen Zuyi was bound in
chains and was to be taken with Zheng He to Nanjing to face
execution for his crimes.25 Fei Xin one of Zheng He’s officers also
gives a firsthand account on the capture of the infamous pirate:
In the third year of Yung-lo (1405) when Emperor
Tai-tsung Wen huang-ti (Zhu Di) of our present
dynasty ordered the principal envoy, the Grand
Eunuch Cheng Ho, and others to take supreme
command of a fleet and to precede to all the foreign
countries, the pirate Chen Tsu-I and his followers
met in the country of Srivijaya where they
plundered foreign merchants and even attacked our
ships. [But] they became victims of a secret plan on
the part of our principal envoy, and like brutes
caught in a net, they were exterminated, their
leaders being captured alive and sent as prisoners to
the imperial palace. After this the seas were restored
to imperial peace and order.26
The capture of the pirate Chen, as shown in this excerpt,
demonstrates that while Zheng He was willing to mostly focus on a
soft power strategy, he was not afraid to use hard power while
carrying out Zhu DI’s foreign policy objectives. From a soft power
25

Wei, “Admiral Zheng He,” 28.
Fei Xin, The Overall Survey of the Star Raft, trans. J.V.G. Mills (Otto
Harrassowitz, 1996), 53.

26
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standpoint, this approach also worked by emptying the sea territory
of Chinese pirates; a considerable boon to China’s neighbors, not
to mention a removing the significant embarrassment to the Ming
Dynasty that these pirates were.
In the summer of 1407, the fleet had returned to China and
Zheng He returned to a very pleased emperor. Although distraught
that no word had been heard about his predecessor, Zhu Di was
still very pleased that the legitimacy of his rule had been
recognized by many rulers in southeast Asia and India. Overall,
this first expedition had shown that Zheng He had a great grasp on
both soft power and hard power. He re-established trade
relationships using the awe and majesty of the Treasure Fleet,
relationships that were in great disrepair for over thirty years. He
also made quick work of a notorious Chinese pirate that was
affecting trade relationships around the area. Ceylon had proved to
be problematic in establishing relations, but they could be dealt
with in the future, as Zheng He would later prove.
Zheng He and the Modern Day
The journeys to Java and Calicut have had lasting impacts on the
relations between China, India and Java today. A crucial part of
China’s soft power is using its past to establish that China’s
relations were peaceful and prosperous with its neighbors for
centuries, especially when it comes to Zheng He, who has served
as a useful bit of propaganda in the last few decades. In May 2005,
the Nanjing Museum and many numerous cities in China, Java and
India celebrated Zheng He’s sexcentenary, celebrating 600 years
since the first voyage of the admiral. The China Heritage Quarterly
gives a brief summarization of the celebrations:
This tribute to Zheng He, master mariner of the
Ming dynasty (1368-1644), is merely one frisson in
the flurry of activities organized for the
sexcentenary. Stamped with patriotism, most events
are designed to appeal to Chinese who hail from the
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various hometowns and localities in China
associated with Zheng He, or who now live in the
areas of Southeast and South Asia, as well as the
Middle East and even East Africa, once visited by
Zheng He's fleets. Although Zheng He came to be
deified and included in local Chinese pantheons in
Tian Hou temples, he was in fact a Muslim, a fact
not overlooked in the present celebrations.27
Beijing has found a great propaganda spokesman in the Ming
admiral. The PRC has recently been using Zheng He in its relations
with the Javanese and India as a way to promote the “peaceful coexistence” between nations that have had long standing relations
with China. However, there have been some pitfalls in the
relationship between the PRC and Java. In Tuban, a part of East
Java, a 30.4-meter-tall statue of Guan Yu a famous Chinese
general of the Three Kingdoms Era (220-280 BC) who was later
deified was unveiled, sparking massive controversy with a
fundamentalist minority of Tuban’s Muslim population. In the
Straits Times the events and controversy are summarized:
Indonesia has urged officials to stand up to mob
pressure after Muslim and nationalist protesters
called for a 30 m-tall statue of a Chinese deity
erected in a temple complex in an East Java town to
be torn down. The brightly painted statue of Guan
Yu, a general who is worshipped by some Chinese
people, was inaugurated last month in a temple
complex in the fishing town of Tuban, and is
claimed to be South-east Asia's tallest
representation of the deity. The statue in Tuban,
27

China Heritage Project, “Shipping News: Zheng He’s Sexcentenary,” China
Heritage Quarterly no. 2 (June 2005),
http://www.chinaheritagequarterly.org/articles.php?searchterm=002_zhenghe.in
c&issue=002.
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about 100 km west of the city of Surabaya, has been
partially covered up after the protests, provoking
both praise and ridicule on social media in the
world's most populous Muslim- majority country
Teten Masduki, chief of staff to President Joko
Widodo, told reporters: "If they ask for the statue to
be torn down, the authorities cannot bow to such
pressure. “Protesters demonstrated this week
outside Surabaya's Parliament against the statue,
some wearing paramilitary-style outfits and waving
placards that read "Demolish it" and "We are not
worshippers of idols”. Allowing a depiction of a
foreign general was "a symbol of treason to this
nation", an unnamed protester said in a video of the
rally on news portal Kompas.com. Officials of the
Kwan Sing Bio Temple in Tuban declined to
comment, but the media have quoted residents as
saying the statue was good for tourism.28
While China’s perception of its soft power is a perception that
celebrates peaceful exploration and relations, that perception may
not always be shared with the nations China is attempting to woo.
In the example shown in East Java concerning the Guan Yu statue,
what China may see as sharing its culture, some Javanese natives
may see as China’s perception of its own soft power as being a
kind of cultural imperialism. There is also a perception by an
extreme religious minority that the statue serves as an insult to the
Muslim populations’ religious beliefs tinged with Indonesian
nationalism clashing with Chinese nationalism. When it comes to
Zheng He, there is perhaps a bit of irony in this point of view
seeing that Zheng He was born to a Muslim father and there is
considerable evidence he may have shared his father’s beliefs at
least on a cultural level. The overall point that is being established
28
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here however, is that China’s own perceptions of its history and
soft power may at many times clash with what other nations and
peoples consider Chinese soft (and hard) power to be. Quite likely
in the case of the Guan Yu statue, religious belief may be used as
an excuse and the real problem lies with nationalism, as implied in
the article.
A large component of Chinese soft power practices is the
idea of “legitimacy,” the legitimacy that is perceived by members
of the PRC government to have been lost in the nineteenth century
and has only started to be regained in the waning years of the
twentieth century. One of the main ideas of this paper is also that
there is an explicit link between the ideas of Ming glory, nonhegemonic expansion and the Confucius Institute. A common
claim made by the PRC regarding the foreign policy of China is
that both historically and today China remains a non-hegemonic
power with the peacefulness of its rise being touted by its
leadership, which makes an implied claim that China’s rivals—like
the United States—do not follow a similar policy.
The distrust of China’s motivations has also been a source of
contention when it comes to national territory as well. The
Senkaku and Diayou islands, dispute between China, Japan and
Korea has shown that China is willing to forego soft power
diplomacy when it comes to territorial integrity. From the forward
to a white paper published by the PRC State Council in 2012, we
can see how seriously China considers territorial integrity to be to
its foreign policy.
Diaoyu Dao and its affiliated islands are an inseparable part
of the Chinese territory. Diaoyu Dao is China's inherent territory in
all historical, geographical and legal terms, and China enjoys
indisputable sovereignty over Diaoyu Dao. Japan’s occupation of
Diaoyu Dao during the Sino-Japanese War in 1895 is illegal and
invalid. After World War II, Diaoyu Dao was returned to China in
accordance with such international legal documents as the Cairo
Declaration and the Potsdam Proclamation. No matter what
unilateral step Japan takes over Diaoyu Dao, it will not change the
fact that Diaoyu Dao belongs to China. For quite some time, Japan
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has repeatedly stirred up troubles on the issue of Diaoyu Dao. On
September 10, 2012, the Japanese government announced the
"purchase" of Diaoyu Dao and its affiliated Nanxiao Dao and
Beixiao Dao and the implementation of the so-called
"nationalization". This is a move that grossly violates China's
territorial sovereignty and international jurisprudence.
China is firmly opposed to Japan's violation of
China's sovereignty over Diaoyu Dao in whatever
form and has taken resolute measures to curb any
such act. China's position on the issue of Diaoyu
Dao is clear-cut and consistent. China's will to
defend national sovereignty and territorial integrity
is firm and its resolve to uphold the outcomes of the
World Anti-Fascist War will not be shaken by any
force.29
Notice the terms “inseparable” and “inherent territory” in the
language of this white paper. These concepts lend credence to the
idea that past humiliations in losing territory to European powers
in the nineteenth century shape China’s national and foreign
policy. The idea of China being “inseparable” has long been a
roadblock in finalizing territorial borders between China and her
neighbors. Therefore, the concerns of nationalists in Indonesia
doesn’t necessarily come from nowhere, or out of just pure
nationalism and jingoism. There is a perceived fear of losing
territory and cultural influence though both traditional and cultural
imperialism, either from the aspect of territory as can be seen in
the Senkaku island dispute or through cultural imperialism as seen
through the incident involving the Guan Yu statue. As China’s soft
power increases, there will be blowback about what is seen as
China encroaching on the culture of others. This is something
which can fuel conspiracy theories like one popular one amongst
29
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certain nationalists in Indonesia, claiming that China’s government
is secretly in control of the entire Indonesian government, and that
these soft power efforts are examples of China imposing its culture
on an unwilling population, threatening cultural sovereignty.
The United States Congressional Research Service
published a white paper in December 2015 summarizing many of
these issues of sovereignty and territory. Titled “Maritime
Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone Disputes Involving
China” the white paper asserts that China is using the so-called
“nine-dash line,” a vaguely located line of demarcation that the
PRC asserts marks its territorial waters.30 The white paper asserts
that China is using a “’salami-slicing’ strategy that employs a
series of incremental actions, none of which by itself is a casus
belli, to gradually change the status quo in China’s favor” in the
words of the report. China in many of these contexts may not even
be following a full soft power strategy but may in some instances
be following a “Sharp Power” strategy. Sharp power is distinct
from soft power in that it focuses on distraction and manipulation.
Christopher Walker and Jessica Ludwig writing for Foreign Affairs
gives a concise definition of the term:
Contrary to some of the prevailing analysis, the
influence wielded by Beijing and Moscow through
initiatives in the spheres of media, culture, think
tanks, and academia is not a “charm offensive,” as
the author Joshua Kurlantzick termed it in his book
Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power is
Defining the World. Nor is it an effort to “share
alternative ideas” or “broaden the debate,” as the
editorial leadership at the Russian and Chinese state
information outlets suggest about themselves. It is
not principally about attraction or even persuasion;
instead, it centers on distraction and manipulation.
30
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These powerful and ambitious authoritarian
regimes, which systematically suppress political
pluralism and free expression to maintain power at
home, are increasingly applying the same principles
internationally.31
This new display of “sharp power” may add a third dynamic to
international power play. Since it is neither hard nor soft power,
sharp power is hard to give a concise category to, but with recent
electoral events in the United States and elsewhere in the last few
years it cannot be denied that creating manipulation and causing
divisiveness in a country’s population has been an effective
strategy. If China is indeed being more aggressive in its territorial
ambitions, this may give credence to the “sharp power” theory in
that while China is using soft power to increase its territorial
sovereignty, it is still using elements of coercion and flexing of
military muscle to achieve that end.

31
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